Meaningless Opportunities: Graham v. Florida and the
Reality of de Facto LWOP Sentences by Freeman, Mark T.
McGeorge Law Review
Volume 44 | Issue 4 Article 6
1-1-2013
Meaningless Opportunities: Graham v. Florida and
the Reality of de Facto LWOP Sentences
Mark T. Freeman
Pacific McGeorge School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Juvenile Law
Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in McGeorge Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mark T. Freeman, Meaningless Opportunities: Graham v. Florida and the Reality of de Facto LWOP Sentences, 44 McGeorge L. Rev. 961
(2013).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr/vol44/iss4/6




Meaningless Opportunities: Graham v. Florida and the 
Reality of de Facto LWOP Sentences 
Mark T. Freeman* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 962 
II. GRAHAM V. FLORIDA AND ITS APPLICATION ................................................ 964 
 A.  When Is a Punishment “Cruel and Unusual”? An Overview of the 
Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence ............................ 964 
 B.   Graham’s Categorical Rule ................................................................... 966 
 C.  The Golden State Is Split: Graham Divides California’s Appellate 
Districts ................................................................................................. 968 
 D.   Post-Graham Developments: The High Court Clarifies Graham in 
Miller v. Alabama and the California Supreme Court Rejects de 
Facto LWOP Sentences ......................................................................... 970 
III. APPLYING THE TESTS FOR CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT TO  
 DE FACTO LWOP SENTENCES ..................................................................... 971 
 A.  The Grossly Disproportionate Test ....................................................... 972 
 B.  Building a Categorical Rule .................................................................. 973 
  1.  A National Consensus Exists Against Imposing de Facto LWOP 
Sentences on Juveniles Who Commit Nonhomicide Offenses ......... 973 
  2.  Exercising Independent Judgment, Part I: Juvenile Offenders as 
a Whole Lack the Culpability to Receive a de Facto LWOP 
Sentence .......................................................................................... 976 
  3.  Exercising Independent Judgment, Part II: De Facto LWOP 
Sentences for Juveniles Do Not Further Legitimate Penological 
Goals ............................................................................................... 977 
  4.  Dissenting Voices: Responding to Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Alito .................................................................................... 980 
 C.  The General Principle Test ................................................................... 982 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS .................................................. 983 
 A.  A Chance for Hope or No Hope at All? ................................................ 983 
 B.  Additional Policy Implications .............................................................. 985 
V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 986 
_05_FREEMAN_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 1/31/2014 9:41 AM 
2013 / The Reality of de Facto LWOP Sentences 
962 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Every year, thousands of American teenagers are arrested and tried as adults.1 
In 2011, state prisons across the country housed almost two thousand juvenile 
offenders.2 Many of these young offenders serve for only a few years.3 But Victor 
Mendez was not so lucky.4 In 2007, when he was sixteen, Mendez and other 
members of the Los Angeles Blythe Street Gang carjacked a green Chevrolet 
Lumina and took it for a spin.5 Mendez parked the car, threatened some 
bystanders with a gun, and took their wallets.6 A jury ultimately convicted 
Mendez of carjacking, assault with a firearm, and “seven counts of second degree 
robbery.”7 The trial court sentenced Mendez to state prison—for eighty-four 
years.8 
Mendez’s lengthy prison sentence raised Eighth Amendment concerns.9 
Notably, the Supreme Court of the United States had recently ruled in Graham v. 
Florida that a state could not sentence juvenile offenders who committed 
nonhomicide crimes to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole 
(LWOP).10 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, also explained that a state 
must give defendants “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on 
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”11 
While Mendez had not received an actual LWOP sentence, he argued that 
because his decades-long sentence exceeded his natural lifespan, it was a de facto 
LWOP sentence, one that was functionally equivalent to the kind of sentences 
condemned by the Supreme Court.12 A California appellate court agreed and held 
that Mendez’s de facto LWOP sentence was cruel and unusual punishment 
 
* J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, 2013; B.A., Economics, Saint Mary’s College 
of California, 2010. I thank Professor Emily Garcia Uhrig for her advice and direction on this Comment. I also 
thank my family and friends for their daily inspiration and the editors of the McGeorge Law Review for their 
tireless work. 
1. E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
PRISONERS IN 2011 33 (2012), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11.pdf (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
2. Id. 
3. From 1985 to 1997, the average juvenile offender served a minimum of five years, and the average 
maximum sentence for violent crime was eight years. KEVIN J. STROM, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROFILE OF STATE PRISONERS UNDER AGE 18, 1985–97, at 1 (2000). 
4. See California v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870, 873 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2010) (discussing Mendez’s 
lengthy sentence). 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 874. 
7. Id. at 873. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010). 
11. Id. 
12. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 882. 
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because he did not have a meaningful opportunity to seek release during his 
lifetime.13 
Mendez and a few other juvenile offenders successfully challenged their de 
facto LWOP sentences by invoking Graham’s general principles.14 But most 
juvenile offenders who have sought relief from their lengthy sentences under 
Graham have failed.15 Indeed, as this Comment goes to press, only a handful of 
courts, including the California Supreme Court in 2012, have held that de facto 
LWOP sentences for juveniles who commit nonhomicide offenses are cruel and 
unusual.16 
This Comment argues that de facto LWOP sentences for juveniles who 
commit nonhomicide offenses categorically violate the Eighth Amendment’s ban 
on cruel and unusual punishment. For purposes of this Comment, I define a “de 
facto LWOP sentence” as a term-of-years sentence that serves as the “functional 
equivalent of a life without parole term,”17 in effect, a sentence that offers the 
possibility of parole in name only. Part II provides a brief overview of the 
Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and how lower courts have 
responded to Graham. Part III explains why de facto LWOP sentences for 
juveniles who commit nonhomicide crimes fail the Supreme Court’s traditional 
Eighth Amendment tests and argues for a categorical ban against these sentences. 
 
13. Id. at 886. 
14. See, e.g., California v. Nuñez, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 616 (Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2011) (invalidating a 175-
year-long sentence for a juvenile who committed aggravated kidnapping); California v. J.I.A., 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
141 (Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2011) (holding unconstitutional a juvenile’s de facto LWOP sentence for various sex 
offenses). 
15. See Scott R. Hechinger, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Antidote to Congress’s One-Way Criminal 
Law Ratchet?, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 408, 425 n.91 (2011) (discussing cases in which juvenile 
offenders have attempted to use Graham to challenge their sentences but have largely failed). 
16. Generally, state supreme courts that have confronted Graham have mostly dealt with actual LWOP, 
not de facto LWOP sentences. See, e.g., Angel v. Virginia, 704 S.E.2d 386, 402 (Va. 2011) (holding that 
Graham did not apply to a juvenile defendant who was sentenced to three life sentences for various sex 
offenses); Missouri v. Andrews, 329 S.W.3d 369, 377 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) (holding that a fifteen-year-old who 
committed first-degree murder cannot invoke Graham); Wisconsin v. Ninham, 797 N.W.2d 451, 474, 478 (Wis. 
2011) (holding that an actual LWOP sentence for a fourteen-year-old who committed first-degree murder was 
not cruel and unusual punishment); Bonilla v. Iowa, 791 N.W.2d 697, 700–01 (Iowa 2010) (holding that a 
mandatory LWOP sentence for a juvenile nonhomicide offender was unconstitutional). The state supreme 
courts that have faced a de facto LWOP sentence for a minor have not reached the merits of its constitutionality. 
See, e.g., Adams v. Georgia, 707 S.E.2d 359 (Ga. 2011) (upholding a juvenile’s twenty-five year to life 
sentence and declining to apply Graham without commentary); Rogers v. Nevada, 267 P.3d 802 (Nev. 2011) 
(holding that the district court abused its discretion when it declined to appoint counsel for a juvenile offender 
in the post-conviction phase, but leaving the issue of de facto LWOP sentences unresolved). As of publication, 
only one federal circuit had addressed, and rejected, a challenge to a de facto LWOP sentence based on 
Graham’s general principles. Bunch v. Smith 685 F.3d 546 (6th Cir. 2012). But see California v. Caballero, 282 
P.3d 291, 295 (Cal. 2012) (holding that de facto LWOP sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders violate 
the Eighth Amendment). 
17. Caballero, 282 P.3d at 297. De facto LWOP sentences, by their nature, do not provide the offender a 
meaningful opportunity for release. See Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 882 (“[C]ommon sense dictates that a 
juvenile who is sentenced at the age of eighteen and who is not eligible for parole until after he is expected to 
die does not have a meaningful . . . opportunity for release.”). 
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Part IV discusses the practical implications of this Comment and whether 
juvenile offenders will see any meaningful change if courts adopt a categorical 
ban. Part V concludes that courts should embrace the spirit of Graham’s holding 
and provide a meaningful opportunity for individuals like Victor Mendez to 
experience life outside of prison before they die.18 
II. GRAHAM V. FLORIDA AND ITS APPLICATION 
This Part analyzes Graham v. Florida and its reception in the lower courts.19 
Section A provides a brief overview of the Supreme Court’s tests for cruel and 
unusual punishment. Section B discusses Graham itself and its new categorical 
rule. Section C discusses the application of Graham in lower courts and uses 
California as an example. Section D examines the Supreme Court’s post-Graham 
jurisprudence, including the California Supreme Court’s rejection of de facto 
LWOP sentences. 
A. When Is a Punishment “Cruel and Unusual”? An Overview of the Supreme 
Court’s Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence 
The Eighth Amendment provides, “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”20 The 
Supreme Court has examined the Eighth Amendment in light of “the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”21 Thus, as 
American society evolves, so too does the Court’s definition of what is cruel and 
unusual.22 Traditionally, the Supreme Court analyzed Eighth Amendment 
challenges under two separate analytical frameworks, depending on the type of 
case: (1) in non-death penalty cases, whether a defendant’s individual sentence is 
grossly disproportionate to his or her crime and (2) in death penalty cases, 
whether any special categorical rules apply.23 
Under the first framework, defendants on a case-by-case basis argue that 
their sentences are excessive in relation to their crimes.24 To determine whether 
the length of a sentence is unconstitutional, the Court must apply a three-step 
test.25 First, the Court compares the “gravity of the offense and the severity of the 
 
18. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010). 
19. See infra Part II.B–C (discussing Graham itself and its aftermath). 
20. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
21. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
22. See id. (elaborating on this point). 
23. Michi Momose, A Case for Hope: Examining Graham v. Florida and Its Implications for Eighth 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 33 U. HAW. L. REV. 391, 394–96 (2010). 
24. Id. at 394–95. 
25. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022 (2010). 
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sentence.”26 Next, if the Court draws an “inference of gross disproportionality,” it 
compares the defendant’s sentence with those sentences “received by other 
offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same 
crime in other jurisdictions.”27 Finally, if this comparison “validate[s] an initial 
judgment that [the] sentence is grossly disproportionate,” the sentence violates 
the Eighth Amendment.28 
The second analytical framework involves several categorical rules involving 
the death penalty.29 These rules typically prevent a state from imposing the death 
penalty in certain cases.30 The Court has divided these categorical rules into two 
types: cases involving the “nature of the offense” and cases involving the 
“characteristics of the offender.”31 In nature-of-the-offense cases, the Court held 
that courts cannot sentence defendants to death for nonhomicide crimes.32 In 
characteristics-of-the-offender cases, the Court held that the death penalty is 
inappropriate for juvenile offenders33 or people “whose intellectual functioning is 
in a low range.”34 
In 2005, in Roper v. Simmons, the Court announced a categorical rule 
prohibiting courts from sentencing juvenile offenders to death.35 The Court’s 
decision included an extensive discussion about juvenile culpability.36 Justice 
Kennedy, writing for the majority, explained that juveniles differ from adult 
offenders in three ways: juveniles are less mature, “are more vulnerable or 
susceptible to negative influences . . . including peer pressure,” and lack a fully 
developed character.37 Justice Kennedy went on to suggest that “[f]rom a moral 
standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of 
an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will 
be reformed.”38 Justice Kennedy’s argument about the “diminished culpability of 
juveniles” would later resurface in Graham v. Florida.39 
 
26. Id. (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 (1991)). 
27. Id. 
28. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
29. Momose, supra note 23, at 396–400. 
30. See infra, text accompanying notes 35–38 (discussing specific types of categorical rules). 
31. Id. at 2022. 
32. Id. (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982)). 
33. See generally Roper, 543 U.S. at 551 (holding that the death penalty cannot be imposed on 
defendants under eighteen years of age); see also infra text accompanying notes 35–38 (discussing Roper in 
detail). 
34. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)). 
35. Roper, 543 U.S. at 551. 
36. Id. at 569–70. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 570. 
39. Id. at 571; see also Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (discussing how juvenile culpability is a factor in 
creating a categorical ban against actual LWOP sentences for nonhomicide offenders). 
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When the Court adopts a categorical rule, it undertakes a two-step analysis.40 
First, the Court considers whether there is a “national consensus against the 
sentencing practice.”41 Second, if such a consensus exists, the Court “must 
determine in the exercise of its own independent judgment whether the 
punishment in question violates the Constitution.”42 When exercising its 
independent judgment, the Court considers factors such as the culpability of the 
offender and whether the sentence furthers legitimate penological goals.43 
B.  Graham’s Categorical Rule 
The Court adhered to its established analytical frameworks for determining 
whether a sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment until it decided 
Graham v. Florida in 2010.44 For the first time, the Court adopted a categorical 
rule outside of the death penalty context.45 Justice Kennedy, writing for the 
majority, held that actual LWOP sentences for juveniles who commit 
nonhomicide offenses violated the Eighth Amendment.46 Moreover, the Court 
noted that a state should “give defendants like Graham some meaningful 
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and 
rehabilitation.”47 
The defendant, Terrance Jamar Graham, was sixteen years old when he 
committed attempted burglary.48 Six months after he pleaded guilty, police again 
arrested Graham for robbery.49 The sentencing judge believed Graham was 
irredeemable because he had quickly returned to a life of crime.50 The judge 
ordered Graham to serve a life sentence.51  
The Supreme Court applied its two-step categorical rule test to Graham’s 
actual LWOP sentence.52 The Court found that a national consensus against 
 
40. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022. 
41. Id. (citing Roper v. Simmons, 541 U.S. 551, 572 (2005)). 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 2028. 
44. Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011. 
45. See id. at 2046 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s new categorical rule “eviscerates” 
the distinction between death and other sentences). In contrast, some have argued that the Graham Court did not 
destroy this distinction, but merely created a heightened standard of review for LWOP sentences under the 
Eighth Amendment. See generally William W. Berry III, More Different than Life, Less Different than Death, 
71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1109 (2010) (articulating this point). 
46. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 2018. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. The trial judge believed that Graham was a danger to the community. Id. Notably, the trial judge 
gave the maximum sentence, while the prosecution had argued for just a thirty year sentence. Id. at 2019–20. 
51. Id. at 2020. This sentence was effectively an actual LWOP sentence because Florida had abolished 
its parole system. Id. 
52. Id. at 2022–23. “This case implicates a particular type of sentence as it applies to an entire class of 
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sentencing juveniles to LWOP for nonhomicide crimes existed.53 Justice Kennedy 
explained that although thirty-seven states allowed juveniles to serve LWOP 
sentences for nonhomicide offenses, “nationwide there are only 109 juvenile 
offenders serving [LWOP] for nonhomicide offenses.”54 The Court then exercised 
its independent judgment in creating a categorical rule.55 In so doing, the Court 
looked at two factors: the lessened culpability of juvenile offenders in general 
and the fact that LWOP sentences in this context did not further legitimate 
penological goals.56 
Justice Kennedy explained that a categorical rule—as opposed to a case-by-
case approach—was necessary for several reasons.57 First, existing state law 
protections did not prevent judges from imposing these sentences on juveniles.58 
Second, Justice Kennedy doubted that “courts taking a case-by-case 
proportionality approach could with sufficient accuracy distinguish the few 
incorrigible juvenile offenders from the many that have the capacity for 
change.”59 Third, the case-by-case approach may prevent a juvenile from 
receiving a proper defense because “[j]uveniles mistrust adults and have limited 
understandings of the criminal justice system . . . .”60 As a result, they “are less 
likely than adults to work effectively with their lawyers . . . .”61 Finally, Justice 
Kennedy argued that a categorical rule would give juvenile offenders a chance to 
start over: 
[A] categorical rule gives all juvenile nonhomicide offenders a chance to 
demonstrate maturity and reform. . . . [LWOP sentences give] no chance 
for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with 
society, no hope. . . . A young person who knows that he or she has no 
chance to leave prison before life’s end has little incentive to become a 
responsible individual. . . . A categorical rule against [LWOP] for 
juvenile nonhomicide offenders avoids the perverse consequence in 
which the lack of maturity that led to an offender’s crime is reinforced by 
the prison term.62 
 
offenders who have committed a range of crimes. As a result, a threshold comparison between the severity of 
the penalty and the gravity of the crime does not advance the analysis. Here . . . the appropriate analysis is the 
one used in cases that involved the categorical approach . . . .” Id. 
53. Id. at 2023. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 2026. 
56. Id. at 2026–30. 
57. Id. at 2030–33. 
58. Id. at 2031. 
59. Id. at 2032. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Several Justices disagreed with the majority.63 Chief Justice Roberts 
concurred in the judgment but argued that a categorical rule was unnecessary.64 
Justices Alito65 and Thomas66 wrote separate dissenting opinions. Justice Alito 
rejected the majority holding and argued it did not apply to lengthy term-of-years 
sentences.67 Justice Thomas did not believe a national consensus existed—“[t]hat 
a punishment is rarely imposed demonstrates nothing more than a general 
consensus that it should be just that—rarely imposed.”68 
C. The Golden State Is Split: Graham Divides California’s Appellate Districts 
The Court’s holding in Graham is quite narrow—it only applies to actual 
LWOP sentences for juveniles who commit nonhomicide offenses.69 Nonetheless, 
in subsequent lower-court cases, juvenile offenders have argued that Justice 
Kennedy’s language about a meaningful opportunity for release should apply to 
de facto LWOP sentences as well.70 The offenders’ argument is simple. First, the 
Supreme Court in Graham banned actual LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders 
who did not commit homicide.71 Second, de facto LWOP sentences are the 
functional equivalent of actual LWOP sentences because neither provides 
juveniles with a meaningful opportunity for release during their lifetime.72 Thus, 
if a juvenile who commits a nonhomicide crime receives a term-of-years 
sentence that exceeds his or her natural lifespan, that sentence violates the Eighth 
Amendment. Unfortunately, most lower courts that have confronted this question 
have refused to apply Graham outside of its narrow holding.73 
However, some California appellate courts extended Graham to include de 
facto LWOP sentences.74 The leading case is California v. Mendez, in which the 
California Second District Court of Appeal held unconstitutional a juvenile’s 
sentence of eighty-four years to life for carjacking75 Mendez argued that, under 
 
63. See infra notes 64–68 and accompanying text (discussing the opinions of Chief Justice Roberts, 
Justice Alito, and Justice Thomas). 
64. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2036 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
65. Id. at 2058–59 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
66. Id. at 2051–58 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
67. Id. at 2058 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
68. Id. at 2051 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
69. Id. at 2030 (majority opinion). 
70. See Hechinger, supra note 15, at 435 n.91 (describing cases in which juvenile defendants used 
Graham to challenge their de facto LWOP sentences). 
71. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030 (stating the holding). 
72. See California v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870, 882–83 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2010) (articulating this 
point). 
73. See, e.g., Hechinger, supra note 15, at 425 n.91 (describing the lower court decisions that have 
declined to extend Graham beyond its holding). 
74. See infra text accompanying notes 78–86 (discussing these cases). 
75. 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 883; see also supra Part I (discussing the case). Mendez challenged his sentence 
under the federal and state constitutions, though the court only discussed the former. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
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his sentence, he would not be eligible for parole until he was eighty-eight years 
old, while the national life expectancy for a typical American male is seventy-six 
years.76 A panel of California’s Second District Court of Appeal agreed that 
Mendez’s sentence was “materially indistinguishable” from an LWOP sentence.77 
Notably, the panel did not expressly apply Graham, but did adhere to the case’s 
general principle that states must provide juveniles a meaningful opportunity for 
release.78 The panel noted that “a state is not required to guarantee eventual 
freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime, [but Graham 
does require] that a state ‘must’ give a juvenile” a meaningful opportunity for 
release.79 Subsequently, some California appellate panels have followed 
Mendez’s reasoning.80 Notably, the California Third District Court of Appeal 
explained why juvenile nonhomicide offenders who commit multiple crimes or 
injure multiple victims can still challenge a de facto LWOP sentence: 
 A distinction premised on the multiple offenses or victims that often 
underlie a de facto LWOP [sentence] is also unpersuasive. The 
distinction finds no traction in Graham, given the juvenile there was a 
recidivist offender sentenced on multiple felonies, including separate 
instances of armed commercial burglary and home invasion robbery. . . . 
Nevertheless the de facto LWOP [sentence] imposed there did not 
survive constitutional scrutiny, based on the lesser culpability of 
juveniles measured against the severity of a sentence denying any 
possibility of release. . . . While the sum of [the defendant’s] conduct is 
more serious because he committed multiple offenses, and he is 
accordingly more culpable than a defendant who commits only a single 
offense, under Graham his culpability remains diminished as a juvenile.81 
In short, the court explained that Graham’s rationale applies to all juvenile 
nonhomicide offenders, regardless of how many victims or offenses are 
 
at 882–83. 
76. Id. at 882. The life expectancy for a typical American female is 81.1 years. DONNA L. HOYERT & 
JIAQUAN XU, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, DIVISION OF VITAL STATISTICS, DEATHS: 
PRELIMINARY DATA FOR 2011, 2 (2012), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_06.pdf 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
77. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 882 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–06 (2000)). 
78. Id. at 882–83. 
79. Id. at 883 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010)) (emphasis added, internal 
quotations omitted). 
80. See, e.g., California v. Nuñez, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 616, 627 (Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2011) (holding that a 
sentence of 175 years to life for a fourteen- year- old defendant was cruel and unusual punishment); California 
v. J.I.A., 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d 141, 149 (Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2011) (holding that a fifty-years-to-life sentence for a 
fourteen-year-old defendant was cruel and unusual punishment because the defendant was ineligible for parole 
until age seventy). In J.I.A., the court also relied on California’s equivalent to the Eighth Amendment to strike 
down the de facto LWOP sentence. 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 150–53. 
81. Nuñez, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 624. 
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involved.82 Each juvenile offender, due to the virtue of his or her age, must 
receive a meaningful opportunity for release, even if the state ultimately does not 
set that offender free.83 
A few months after the Mendez decision, a different panel of the Second 
District Court of Appeal upheld a 110-year sentence for a sixteen year old who 
committed attempted murder.84 In that case, California v. Caballero, the court 
expressly refused to apply Graham’s general principles.85 The court instead noted 
that there are only two ways a juvenile defendant in California can receive a 
sentence that exceeds his or her lifespan: (1) “commit crimes against multiple 
victims during separate incidents,” or (2) “commit certain enumerated offenses, 
discharge a gun, and inflict great bodily injury upon at least two victims.”86 The 
court reasoned that, although the combined sentences exceeded the defendant’s 
life expectancy, the overall sentence was constitutional because each individual 
sentence was commensurate to the defendant’s crimes.87 Subsequently, other 
panels of the California Second District Court of Appeal followed Caballero’s 




D.  Post-Graham Developments: The High Court Clarifies Graham in Miller v. 
Alabama and the California Supreme Court Rejects de Facto LWOP 
Sentences 
Shortly after deciding Graham, the Court, in Miller v. Alabama, took up the 
question of whether the case’s categorical ban on LWOP sentences for juvenile 
nonhomicide offenders applied to juvenile homicide offenders as well.90 While 
the Court did not categorically ban all such sentences, it held that mandatory 
LWOP sentences for juvenile homicide offenders violated the Eighth 
 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 624–25. 
84. California v. Caballero, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 920, 927 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2011). 
85. Id. at 926. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. “Following Mendez’s reasoning, an individual who shot and severely injured any number of 
victims during separate attempts on their lives could not receive a term commensurate with his or her crimes if 
all the victims had the good fortune to survive their wounds, because the sentence would exceed the 
perpetrator’s life expectancy. Graham does not purport to compel such a result.” Id. But see Nuñez, 125 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d at 624 (arguing that the number of crimes or victims involved is irrelevant because the defendant is a 
juvenile). 
88. See, e.g., California v. Ramirez, 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 155, 165 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2011) (holding that a 
sentence of 120 years to life for a juvenile defendant who committed attempted murder was constitutional). But 
see id. at 166–71 (Manella, J., dissenting) (arguing that Graham applies and that the defendant’s sentence is 
unconstitutional). 
89. California v. Cabellero, 282 P.3d 291, 293, 295 (Cal. 2012). 
90. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
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Amendment.91 The Court reasoned that “none of what [the Graham court] said 
about children . . . is crime specific. . . . Graham’s reasoning implicates any life-
without-parole sentence imposed on a juvenile, even as its categorical bar relates 
only to nonhomicide offenses.”92 
Just a few months after Miller, the California Supreme Court addressed the 
appellate split on de facto LWOP sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders.93 
In a brief, unanimous opinion, the California Supreme Court in California v. 
Caballero reversed the lower court and held that “sentencing a juvenile offender 
for a nonhomicide offense to a term of years with a parole eligibility date that 
falls outside the juvenile offender’s natural life expectancy constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.”94 The court 
explained that Miller “made it clear that Graham’s ‘flat ban’ on life without 
parole sentences for juvenile offenders in nonhomicide cases applies to their 
sentencing equation regardless of . . . how a sentencing court structures the life 
without parole sentence.”95 Because Graham applies to any LWOP sentencing 
regime for juvenile nonhomicide offenders, the California Supreme Court 
explained it also applies to a “term-of-years sentence that amounts to the 
functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence imposed in this case.”96 At 
the end of its opinion, the Court reiterated that new sentences must “not violate 
the defendant’s Eighth Amendment rights and must provide him or her a 
‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and 
rehabilitation’ under Graham’s mandate.”97 
III. APPLYING THE TESTS FOR CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT  
TO DE FACTO LWOP SENTENCES 
This Part explains why de facto LWOP sentences will fare poorly under the 
Supreme Court of the United States’ tests for cruel and unusual punishment. 
Section A briefly discusses the grossly disproportionate test. Section B discusses 
how de facto LWOP sentences for juveniles who commit nonhomicide crimes 
satisfy the two elements of the categorical rule test; first, it explains why a 
national consensus against these sentences exists and second, why in a court’s 
 
91. Id. at 2475. 
92. Id. at 2465 (emphasis added). Chief Justice Roberts, in dissent, argued that the Court’s opinion 
might invite a future Court to take dramatic measures: “Unless confined, the only stopping point for the Court’s 
analysis would be never permitting juvenile offenders to be tried as adults.” Id. at 2481 (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting). 
93. Cabellero, 282 P.3d at 293; see also supra Part II.C (detailing the facts of this case and the lower 
court’s opinion). 
94. Cabellero, 282 P.3d at 295.  
95. Id. at 294. 
96. Id. at 295. 
97. Id. at 295–96. 
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independent judgment, the practice violates the Constitution. That section also 
discusses opposing arguments. Section C explains how Graham’s general 
principle—that states must offer juvenile defendants a meaningful opportunity 
for release—applies to de facto LWOP sentences. 
A.  The Grossly Disproportionate Test 
Juvenile offenders can challenge their sentences as grossly disproportionate 
to the offense committed.98 In this situation, a juvenile offender must first argue 
that the severity of a de facto LWOP sentence is grossly disproportionate to the 
gravity of the offense.99 A court “can consider a particular offender’s mental 
state” when evaluating this argument.100 Juvenile offenders could argue that, 
because a person’s “culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial 
degree, by reason of youth and immaturity,”101 and because a de facto LWOP 
sentence is so severe that it denies the offender all hope and renders “good 
behavior and character improvement . . . immaterial,”102 the sentence is 
unconstitutional. 
Assuming a court agrees, the defendant must next argue that a de facto 
LWOP sentence is more severe than those imposed on other offenders “in the 
same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other 
jurisdictions.”103 In general, juveniles who receive de facto LWOP sentences 
constitute a small minority of the juveniles who serve lengthy sentences.104 This 
Comment estimates that only seventy-one juvenile offenders nationwide are 
serving de facto LWOP sentences.105 In contrast, the historical average prison 
sentence for a juvenile offender who committed a violent crime was only eight 
and one-half years.106 These numbers are instructive because they reveal how rare 
a de facto LWOP sentence is. Thus, a juvenile offender who receives a de facto 
LWOP sentence must serve a punishment that is harsher than what most of his or 
 
98. Momose, supra note 23, at 395–96. 
99. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022 (2010) (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 
1005 (1991)) (discussing the first element of the test). 
100. Id. at 2037 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290–91 (1983)). 
101. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005). 
102. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027 (quoting Naovarath v. Nevada, 779 P.2d 944 (Nev. 1989)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
103. See id. at 2022 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 (1991)) (discussing the second 
element of the test). 
104. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the national consensus against de facto LWOP sentences and the 
assumptions behind this estimate). 
105. Id. The Sentencing Project, a group that gathers information from state correctional departments 
about prisoner demographics, provides some additional information on this point. Interactive Map, 
SENTENCING PROJECT, http://sentencing project.org/map/map.cfm#map (last visited Mar. 23, 2012) (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review). 
106. See STROM, supra note 3, at 1 (stating that average maximum sentence of a violent juvenile 
offender in 1985 was 109 months and in 1997 was 98 months). 
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her peers receive.107 Although successful challenges are “exceedingly rare” under 
this proportionality argument,108 juvenile offenders are more likely to raise 
inferences of gross disproportionality due to their age.109 Because juveniles 
serving de facto LWOP sentences can satisfy the elements of the test, courts may 
strike down their sentences.110 However, because the test is fact-specific, not all 
defendants will successfully challenge their de facto LWOP sentence.111 
B. Building a Categorical Rule 
Because a case-by-case approach will not fully protect juveniles from de 
facto LWOP sentences, courts should impose a categorical ban on this sentencing 
practice. In order to impose a categorical ban, a court must find that (1) a national 
consensus against imposing LWOP sentences exists, and (2) in the court’s 
independent judgment, the sentence violates the Eighth Amendment.112 When 
deciding the second element, a court can rely on factors such as the culpability of 
the defendant113 and whether the sentence furthers legitimate penological goals.114 
1. A National Consensus Exists Against Imposing de Facto LWOP 
Sentences on Juveniles Who Commit Nonhomicide Offenses 
To determine whether a national consensus exists, a court looks to enacted 
legislation and “[a]ctual sentencing practices.”115 Thus, a court can see how many 
states allow the sentencing practice or, alternatively, how often states actually 
impose that sentence.116 In Graham, the Supreme Court noted that thirty-seven 
states—a supermajority—permitted LWOP sentences for juveniles who commit 
nonhomicide offenses, but found that “an examination of actual sentencing 
practices in jurisdictions where the sentence in question is permitted . . . discloses 
a consensus against its use.”117 Indeed, Justice Kennedy wrote that “sentences of 
life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders . . . are most 
 
107. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the rarity of de facto LWOP sentences). 
108. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980). 
109. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2039 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (arguing that the 
Court could invalidate Graham’s sentence under the grossly disproportionate test and that “[t]here is no reason 
why an offender’s juvenile status should be excluded from the [proportionality] analysis.”). 
110. Id. at 2022, 2039. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 2022 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 541 U.S. 551, 572 (2005)). 
113. Id. (citing Roper, 541 U.S. at 568) (stating that the Court can consider whether the defendant was 
under the age of eighteen or mentally handicapped). 
114. Id. at 2028. 
115. Id. at 2023. 
116. Id. at 2023–24. 
117. Id. at 2023. 
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infrequent.”118 The Court explained that a national consensus existed because 
there were “only 109 juvenile offenders serving [LWOP sentences] for 
nonhomicide offenses.”119 Thus, even if a supermajority of states allow a 
sentencing practice, the Court will find a national consensus against that practice 
if the states rarely use it.120 
Currently, there is no data regarding how many juvenile offenders serve de 
facto LWOP sentences for nonhomicide offenses. However, there is data 
regarding how many juveniles serve life sentences in general, and the types of 
crimes these juvenile offenders committed.121 The rest of this section uses a 
conservative hypothetical to illustrate why a national consensus exists. This 
hypothetical takes the following steps: (1) it lists the number of juvenile 
offenders currently in state prisons, (2) it calculates the number of juvenile 
offenders who were convicted of murder and other crimes not relevant to this 
analysis and then excludes them, and (3) it estimates the number of remaining 
juveniles serving de facto LWOP sentences for nonhomicide offenses. 
In 2011, state prisons nationwide housed 1,790 juvenile offenders.122 Of those 
offenders, the prisons admitted approximately 125 (seven percent) for murder 
convictions and a combined 251 (fourteen percent) for drug offenses (nine 
percent) and public order offenses (five percent).123 Those 376 individuals are 
excluded from this analysis.124 
 
118. Id. (emphasis added). 
119. Id. Justice Thomas argued that no national consensus existed because a supermajority of states 
allowed the practice. Id. at 2049 (Thomas, J., dissenting). According to Justice Thomas, the Court’s reliance on 
the infrequent usage of the sentence was “nothing short of stunning.” Id. “[T]he Court has never banished into 
constitutional exile a sentencing practice that the laws of a majority, let alone a supermajority, of States 
expressly permit.” Id. Justice Thomas later added that “[b]ased on its rarity of use, the Court proclaims a 
consensus against the practice . . . [but just because] a sentence is rarely imposed demonstrates nothing more 
than a general consensus that it should be just that—rarely imposed.” Id. at 2051. 
120. See id. at 2023 (discussing how the Court determined a national consensus).  
121. See CARSON & SABOL, supra note 1, at 20 (listing the number of juvenile offenders that state 
prisons housed in 2011); HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT 238 (2006) (listing the 
types of crimes that the incoming juvenile offenders committed); see also ASHLEY NELLIS & RYAN S. KING, 
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, NO EXIT: THE EXPANDING USE OF LIFE SENTENCES IN AMERICA 17–18 (2009), 
available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/publications/inc_NoExitSept2009.pdf (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review) (providing additional data regarding juvenile life sentences in general). 
122. CARSON & SABOL, supra note 1, at 33. This analysis uses the most recent juvenile admittance data 
available, but estimates the number of juveniles who committed homicide and other crimes based on 
percentages from 2002. While this latter data set is older, it is safe to assume that the percentage of juveniles 
admitted for various crimes has remained relatively stable. Compare JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, JUVENILES IN ADULT PRISONS AND JAILS 7 (2000) (listing the 
number of juveniles who committed homicide offenses in 1997 as seven percent of all juvenile offenders 
admitted to state prison), with SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 121, at 238 (using 2002 figures, but showing 
that the number of juvenile offenders who committed homicide, as a percentage of juveniles admitted to state 
prison, remained at seven percent). 
123. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 121, at 238. 
124. This Comment excludes these juvenile offenders because it focuses on nonhomicide offenses that 
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Of the 1,414 juvenile offenders remaining, it is safe to assume that only a 
small percentage of them received a de facto LWOP sentence125—a multi-decade 
long sentence that exceeds their natural life span. Indeed, from 1985 to 1997, the 
average maximum sentence for a juvenile offender who committed a violent 
crime was only eight and one-half years.126 In addition, there are only a few 
circumstances in which juvenile offenders can receive a de facto LWOP 
sentence.127 In California, for example, a juvenile offender can only receive a de 
facto LWOP sentence if he or she commits: (1) “crimes against multiple victims 
during separate incidents,” or (2) “certain enumerated offenses, discharge[s] a 
gun, and inflict[s] great bodily injury upon at least two victims.”128 
Assuming conservatively that five-percent of these 1,414 individuals 
received a de facto LWOP sentence, seventy-one juveniles remain. The majority 
of these seventy-one individuals probably received their sentences in the five 
states with the largest concentration of juveniles serving life sentences: 
California, Texas, Pennsylvania, Florida, and Nevada. 129 
Thus, because only an estimated seventy-one juveniles are serving de facto 
LWOP sentences for nonhomicide offenses nationwide, and because it is likely 
that many of these individuals are serving these sentences in only five states,130 
courts should find that states rarely impose these types of sentences.131 Because 
states rarely impose these sentences, and because the Supreme Court has stated 
that a national consensus exists when states rarely use a sentencing practice,132 
courts should find that a national consensus against sentencing juveniles to de 
facto LWOP sentences for nonhomicide offenses exists. 
 
might incur de facto LWOP sentences. See, e.g., California v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 
2010) (reversing a de facto LWOP sentence for carjacking); California v. Nuñez, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 616, 627 
(Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2011) (invalidating a 175-year-long sentence for a juvenile who committed aggravated 
kidnapping); California v. J.I.A., 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d 141 (Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2011) (holding unconstitutional a de 
facto LWOP sentence for various sex offenses). Given that most of these cases involved serious crimes against 
people, it seems unlikely that drug offenders or public order offenders would receive a de facto LWOP 
sentence. See, e.g., id.; Nunez, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 627; J.I.A., 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 144.  
125. See NELLIS & KING, supra note 121, at 17 (discussing the rarity in sentencing trends). 
126. STROM, supra note 3, at 1. 
127. See infra text accompanying note 128 (discussing California as an example). 
128. California v. Caballero, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 920, 926 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2011). California’s numbers 
are important because the state houses the largest number of juveniles serving life sentences. NELLIS & KING, 
supra note 121, at 17–18. 
129. See NELLIS & KING, supra note 121, at 16 (ordering these five states by largest juvenile life 
offender population). For comparison, the juvenile offenders who served actual LWOP sentences for 
nonhomicide offenses were concentrated in only three states, with the majority in Florida. PAOLO G. ANNINO ET 
AL., FL. ST. UNIV., JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR NONHOMICIDE OFFENSES: FLORIDA COMPARED TO 
NATION 15 (2009). 
130. See NELLIS & KING, supra note 121, at 17 (listing California, Texas, Pennsylvania, Florida, and 
Nevada). 
131. See supra text accompanying notes 96–102 (discussing the statistics behind this conclusion). 
132. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023 (2010). 
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2.  Exercising Independent Judgment, Part I: Juvenile Offenders as a Whole 
Lack the Culpability to Receive a de Facto LWOP Sentence 
After determining a national consensus exists, a court would use its 
independent judgment to determine whether a categorical rule is appropriate.133 
While making this independent judgment, a court can look to the culpability of 
the offender in question.134 In the context of this Comment, a court would look to 
the culpability of juvenile criminal offenders as a class.135 The Supreme Court, in 
Roper v. Simmons, established that juveniles, when compared to adults, generally 
are immature, lack a strong sense of responsibility and fully formed characters, 
and are vulnerable to peer pressure.136 Thus, a juvenile defendant is not as 
culpable as an adult who commits the same offense.137 Indeed, advances in 
neuroscience and psychology reveal that a juvenile’s brain is less developed than 
an adult’s.138 Overall, juvenile transgressions are “not as morally reprehensible as 
[those] of an adult.”139 
The Supreme Court in Graham recognized that “[l]ife without parole is an 
especially harsh punishment for a juvenile. Under this sentence a juvenile 
offender will on average serve more years and a greater percentage of his life in 
prison than an adult offender.”140 The Court explained that actual LWOP 
sentences are inappropriate for juveniles who commit nonhomicide offenses 
because, “when compared to an adult murderer, [juvenile offenders] who did not 
kill or intend to kill [have] a twice diminished moral culpability.”141 Likewise, de 
facto LWOP sentences are just as severe as actual LWOP sentences because in 
both situations the offender will die in prison.142 But it is arguable that juveniles 
whose sentences allow for the possibility of parole (even if they may never 
receive it in their lifetimes) are even less morally culpable than people who 
receive actual LWOP sentences.143 Given the severity of a de facto LWOP 
 
133. Id. at 2022 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 541 U.S. 551, 572 (2005)). In theory, the Court could still 
determine that a punishment is cruel and unusual even without a national consensus. See id. at 2026 (noting that 
the Court will give strong deference to community consensus, but that consensus “is not itself determinative” of 
whether an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred). 
134. Id. at 2022. 
135. Id. at 2026. 
136. Id.; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70. 
137. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026–27. 
138. Id. at 2026. See generally Natalie Pifer, Is Life the Same as Death?: Implications of Graham v. 
Florida, Roper v. Simmons, and Atkins v. Virginia on Life Without Parole Sentences for Juvenile and Mentally 
Retarded Offenders, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1495 (2010) (describing the scientific advances). 
139. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988)) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
140. Id. at 2028. 
141. Id. at 2027. 
142. See California v. Caballero, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 920, 925 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2011) (noting that a de 
facto LWOP sentence is the functional equivalent of an actual LWOP sentence). 
143. See Brief for Petitioner at 8, California v. Caballero, 250 P.3d 179 (2011) (No. B 217709), 2011 
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sentence, and that juvenile offenders (especially those who committed 
nonhomicide crimes) are less morally culpable than those who receive an actual 
LWOP sentence, courts in their independent judgment should establish a 
categorical ban on de facto LWOP sentences. 
3.  Exercising Independent Judgment, Part II: De Facto LWOP Sentences 
for Juveniles Do Not Further Legitimate Penological Goals 
Courts should also look to whether a particular sentence furthers legitimate 
penological goals when deciding if a categorical ban is appropriate.144 In Graham, 
the Supreme Court determined that LWOP sentences for juvenile nonhomicide 
offenders did not further traditional penological goals of retribution, 
rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation.145 This section explains why de 
facto LWOP sentences do not further any of these goals.146 
First, de facto LWOP sentences do not further the goal of retribution.147 The 
Supreme Court described this punishment theory as a way for society to restore 
“the moral imbalance caused by the offense.”148 Simply, retribution means that “a 
criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of the 
criminal offender.”149 In Graham, Justice Kennedy described how LWOP 
sentences imposed on juveniles who committed nonhomicide crimes do not 
reflect the lessened culpability of juveniles in general.150 The Court explained that 
“retribution does not justify imposing the second most severe penalty on the less 
culpable juvenile nonhomicide offender.”151  
Likewise, de facto LWOP sentences do not further the goal of retribution 
because they are the functional equivalent of “the second most severe penalty” in 
 
WL 2357944 at *17 (“Under Graham, however, minors who did not commit homicide, but cannot be paroled, 
are entitled to release because they have twice-diminished moral responsibility. . . . It therefore follows that 
juveniles who are sentenced to life with the possibility of parole are less culpable still.” (internal citation 
omitted)). 
144. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028. 
145. Id. at 2028–29. States are free to choose which goal they want their penal system to represent. Id. at 
2028. California, for example, has chosen retribution. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West 2004 & Supp. 
2013). 
146. Justice Werdegar’s concurring opinion in the California Supreme Court’s Caballero decision also 
discusses these points, albeit briefly. California v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 297–98 (Cal. 2012) (Werdegar, J., 
concurring). 
147. See infra notes 148–159 and accompanying text (explaining how de facto LWOP sentences do not 
effectively punish an offender for punishment’s sake). 
148. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028. 
149. Id. (quoting Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987)) (internal quotations omitted). 
150. Id. See generally supra Part III.B.2 (discussing how juveniles are less culpable than adults in 
general). 
151. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028. See generally Pifer, supra note 138 (describing juvenile psychology 
and differences with adults). 
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the American justice system.152 Moreover, when states imprison juveniles based 
on principles of retribution, they often overlook the offenders’ personal 
background.153 But a juvenile offender’s background might explain why he or she 
turned to crime in the first place. He or she might come from a broken home,154 
suffer from mental illness,155 or commit crime due to other personal tragedies that 
shaped his or her outlook on life.156 Thus, because de facto LWOP sentences tend 
to ignore a juvenile offender’s personal history, they do not further the goal of 
retribution, which aims to reflect the defendant’s culpability.157 
In addition, de facto LWOP sentences do not further the goal of 
rehabilitation.158 While “the concept of rehabilitation is imprecise,” it involves, at 
some level, a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release.”159 A de facto LWOP 
sentence keeps juvenile offenders effectively imprisoned for life and thus 
“forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal.”160 Moreover, juvenile nonhomicide 
offenders, as a class, have a “capacity for change,” but cannot take advantage of 
any positive changes in their personality or moral character because “the State 
[made] an irrevocable judgment about that person’s value and place in society.”161 
A de facto LWOP sentence, like an actual LWOP sentence, “is an especially 
harsh punishment for a juvenile. Under this sentence, a juvenile offender will on 
average serve more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an 
adult offender.”162 De facto LWOP sentences—which offer the possibility of 
parole in name only—deny the juvenile offender any hope for personal 
improvement.163 Indeed, these sentences deprive “the convict of the most basic 
 
152. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028; see also California v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870, 882 (Ct. App. 2d 
Dist. 2010) (describing the defendant’s de facto LWOP sentence as “materially indistinguishable” from an 
actual LWOP sentence). 
153. Sally Terry Green, Realistic Opportunity for Release Equals Rehabilitation: How the States Must 
Provide Meaningful Opportunity for Release, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 20 (2011). 
154. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2018–20 (discussing how Graham’s parents “were addicted to crack 
cocaine [and that Graham] began drinking alcohol and using tobacco at age nine and smoked marijuana at age 
thirteen.”). 
155. See California v. Caballero, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 920, 921 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2011) (noting that 
Caballero suffered from schizophrenia at the time of his crimes). 
156. See California v. J.I.A., 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d 141, 146 (Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2011) (noting how the 
defendant, who sexually abused his victims, was himself sexually abused). 
157. See Brief for Petitioner at 8, California v. Caballero, 250 P.3d 179 (2011) (No. B 217709), 2011 
WL 2357944, at *17 (“Under Graham, however, minors who did not commit homicide, but cannot be paroled, 
are entitled to release because they have twice-diminished moral responsibility. . . . It therefore follows that 
juveniles who are sentenced to life with the possibility of parole are less culpable still.”). 
158. See infra text accompanying notes 159–165 (discussing how a de facto LWOP sentence is the 
farthest thing from rehabilitation). 
159. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028, 2030. See generally Green, supra note 153, at 1 (arguing that the states 
must reform or implement rehabilitative programs to comply with Graham). 
160. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 2028. 
163. Id. at 2027. 
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liberties without giving hope of restoration.”164 Because de facto LWOP 
sentences do not offer any meaningful opportunity for release, they do not further 
the goal of rehabilitation.165 
De facto LWOP sentences also do not further the goal of deterrence.166 
According to the deterrence theory of punishment, criminal sentences “may serve 
to prevent future crime.”167 But the Graham Court suggested that juveniles, as a 
class, “will be less susceptible to deterrence”168 because they tend to lack maturity 
and a sense of responsibility, and may engage in “impetuous and ill-considered 
actions and decisions.”169 Indeed, de facto LWOP sentences do not appear to 
deter juvenile crime because courts tend to impose the sentence only on juveniles 
who commit a series of crimes.170 Moreover, Justice Kennedy observed that 
actual LWOP sentences probably did not deter juvenile offenders from 
committing crimes because states rarely imposed the sentence.171 Likewise, 
judges impose de facto LWOP sentences only in rare circumstances.172 Because 
de facto LWOP sentences for juveniles do not prevent these offenders from 
committing multiple crimes and because states rarely impose the sentence, de 
facto LWOP sentences do not further the goal of deterrence.173 
Finally, the goal of incapacitation does not justify de facto LWOP sentences. 
The incapacitation theory of punishment suggests that a state should imprison 
some criminals so that those individuals do not commit more crimes.174 
Admittedly, supporters of de facto LWOP sentences would point to this goal to 
justify punishing juvenile offenders.175 They would explain that juvenile 
 
164. Id. (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 300–01 (1983)). 
165. See supra text accompanying notes 159–165 (explaining how a de facto LWOP sentences fail to 
serve a rehabilitative purpose). 
166. See infra text accompanying notes 170–172 (discussing how de facto LWOP sentences will not 
prevent future crimes). 
167. Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. 
REV. 843, 853 (2002). 
168. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005)) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
169. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)) (internal quotations omitted). 
170. See, e.g., California v. Caballero, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 920, 926 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2011) (noting how 
California only imposes de facto LWOP sentences on offenders who commit multiple crimes or injure multiple 
victims); California v. Nuñez, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 616, 624 (Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2011) (explaining that multiple 
victims or crimes often “underlie” de facto LWOP sentences). 
171. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028–29. 
172. See supra Part III.B.1 (describing how courts only impose de facto LWOP sentences on rare 
occasions). 
173. See supra text accompanying notes 168–172 (discussing how de fact LWOP sentences do not serve 
the deterrence theory of punishment). 
174. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029 (discussing the limits of incapacitation theory as an explanation for 
LWOP sentences). 
175. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2490 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“If imprisonment 
does nothing else, it removes the criminal from the general population and prevents him from committing 
additional crimes in the outside world.”).  
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offenders like Rodrigo Caballero—who the state charged with three counts of 
attempted murder—should remain in prison because they committed serious 
crimes.176 But the Supreme Court repeatedly explains in Graham that juveniles 
are less culpable than adult offenders, especially in the nonhomicide context.177 
While the Court is aware that juveniles who commit nonhomicide crimes should 
receive some punishment, it has strong words for those who believe such 
offenders should be locked up for life: 
To justify life without parole on the assumption that the juvenile offender 
forever will be a danger to society requires the sentencer to make a 
judgment that the juvenile is incorrigible. The characteristics of juveniles 
make that judgment questionable. . . . As one court concluded in a 
challenge to a life without parole sentence for a 14-year-old, 
“incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.”178 
Although certain juvenile offenders do commit serious nonhomicide crimes, 
de facto LWOP sentences carry the same effect as actual LWOP sentences—the 
juvenile offender will never again step foot outside of prison. While 
incapacitation may be a worthy goal in some contexts, de facto LWOP sentences 
deny “the juvenile offender a chance to demonstrate growth and maturity.”179 
Moreover, if a state imposes de facto LWOP sentences for incapacitation 
purposes on nonhomicide juvenile offenders, it will violate Graham’s central 
premise that juvenile nonhomicide offenders must receive a meaningful 
opportunity for release.180 Thus, incapacitation does not justify de facto LWOP 
sentences.181 Because de facto LWOP sentences do not further any legitimate 
penological goals, courts should adopt a categorical rule banning these sentences 
for juvenile offenders. 
4.  Dissenting Voices: Responding to Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito 
The previous three subsections explained why courts should adopt a 
categorical rule banning de facto LWOP sentences for juvenile nonhomicide 
offenders. But supporters of de facto LWOP sentences have some allies on the 
 
176. California v. Caballero, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 920, 921 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2011); see also Graham, 130 
S. Ct. at 2029 (noting that “[r]ecidivism is a serious risk to public safety. . . .”); Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2041 
(Roberts, C.J., concurring) (discussing specific instances of juvenile cruelty). 
177. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the Court’s analysis of juvenile culpability). 
178. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029 (quoting Workman v. Kentucky, 429 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1968)). 
179. Id. 
180. Id. at 2030. 
181. See also infra Part III.B.4 (addressing arguments by Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts that 
suggest juveniles who committed terrible crimes are irredeemable). 
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Supreme Court.182 Justice Alito’s dissent183 and Chief Justice Roberts’ 
concurrence
184
 in Graham provide arguments for de facto LWOP supporters.185 
Justice Alito’s dissent flatly rejects the idea of banning de facto LWOP 
sentences.186 “Nothing in the Court’s opinion affects the imposition of a sentence 
to a term of years without the possibility of parole,” he writes.187 Indeed, 
Graham’s attorney conceded that a sentence of forty years without parole would 
probably not violate the Eighth Amendment.188 But a juvenile who received a 
forty-year sentence at age seventeen would be eligible for parole at age fifty- 
seven, and thus might be released before his or her life expectancy. A true de 
facto LWOP sentence deprives the juvenile offender of all hope because there is 
no meaningful possibility of release. Rodrigo Caballero, for example, was 
sentenced to 110 years in prison.189 Victor Mendez received an eighty-four year 
sentence.190 In light of such sentences, and the fact that states must give juvenile 
nonhomicide offenders a meaningful opportunity for release, it is difficult to 
justify Justice Alito’s reasoning. 
In contrast to Justice Alito, Chief Justice Roberts offers a compromise.191 He 
argues that Graham’s sentence was cruel and unusual under the grossly 
disproportionate test,192 but a categorical rule banning actual LWOP sentences in 
this context is unnecessary.193 The Chief Justice argues that courts require 
flexibility when sentencing defendants, and points to cases where juveniles 
committed horrific nonhomicide crimes.194 
A ban against de facto LWOP sentences would indeed allow juvenile 
offenders who commit heinous nonhomicide crimes to possibly obtain release 
before the end of natural life expectancy. But the majority opinion in Graham 
anticipated these problems: “A state is not required to guarantee eventual 
freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime.”195 Moreover, 
those “who commit truly horrifying crimes as juveniles may turn out to be 
 
182. See infra text accompanying notes 186–194 (discussing the opinions of Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Alito). 
183. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2058–59 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
184. Id. at 2036–42 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
185. But see California v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 297 (Cal. 2012) (Werdegar, J., concurring) 
(“Characterization by the Graham dissenters of the scope of the majority opinion is, of course, dubious authority 
. . . .”).  
186. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2058 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
187. Id. 
188. Id. 
189. California v. Caballero, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 920, 920–21 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2011). 
190. California v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870, 870 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2010). 
191. See infra text accompanying notes 192–194 (discussing Chief Justice Roberts’ reasoning). 
192. See supra Part II.A (discussing the “grossly disproportionate” framework). 
193. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2036 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
194. See id. at 2041 (“But what about Milagro Cunningham, a 17-year-old who beat and raped an 8-
year-old girl before leaving her to die under 197 pounds of rock in a recycling bin in a remote landfill?”). 
195. Id. at 2030 (majority opinion). 
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irredeemable, and thus deserving of incarceration for the duration of their lives. 
The Eighth Amendment does not foreclose the possibility that persons convicted 
of nonhomicide crimes committed before adulthood will remain behind bars for 
life.”196 
Indeed, if states ban de facto LWOP sentences, they must provide juvenile 
offenders a meaningful opportunity for release.197 This language means that states 
should give all nonhomicide juvenile offenders a chance to grow and prove that 
they deserve to reenter civilized society.198 But juvenile offenders must also 
accept personal responsibility for their actions and work hard for redemption; the 
state is not obligated to hand them a get-out-of-prison-free card.199 
C. The General Principle Test200 
Instead of creating a separate categorical rule, courts could alternatively rely 
on Graham’s general principle, that juvenile nonhomicide offenders must receive 
a meaningful opportunity for release,201 and strike down sentences on a case-by-
case basis. The court in California v. Mendez did just that.202 From a conceptual 
standpoint, this test is simple to administer—a court would examine a juvenile 
nonhomicide offender’s life expectancy and compare it with the length of the 
sentence. The court could take into consideration the offender’s life 




198. See id. at 2032 (“Maturity can lead to that considered reflection which is the foundation for 
remorse, renewal, and rehabilitation.”). 
199. See supra text accompanying notes 78–79 (explaining the state’s obligation to give juvenile 
offenders a mere opportunity for release, not a guarantee). Even if a juvenile offender receives this opportunity 
for release, he might not necessarily receive parole, especially if the state has expressed concern for crime 
victims. Thus, those juvenile offenders who commit heinous nonhomicide crimes and show no sign of 
rehabilitation are less likely to walk free. The key is that the state gave them an opportunity to change. See, e.g., 
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28 (providing a comprehensive list of rights to crime victims including the right to appear 
at parole proceedings).  
200. See California v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870, 882–83 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2010) (discussing the 
application of Graham’s general principles). 
201. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030; California v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 295 (Cal. 2012) (“Although 
proper authorities may later determine that youths should remain incarcerated for their natural lives, the state 
may not deprive them at sentencing of a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate their rehabilitation and fitness 
to reenter society in the future.”). 
202. 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 882–83 (discussing the application of Graham’s general principles). The 
California Supreme Court did not apply the general principle test when it struck down de facto LWOP 
sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders, but instead extended Graham to include these sentences. See 
California v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 295 (2012) (“Miller therefore made it clear that Graham’s ‘flat ban’ on 
life without parole sentences applies to all nonhomicide cases involving juvenile offenders, including the term-
of-years sentence that amounts to the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence imposed in this 
case.”). 
203. See, e.g., Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2018 (discussing the defendant’s personal history). 
204. See supra note 189 (discussing certain instances of juvenile cruelty). 
_05_FREEMAN_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 1/31/2014 9:41 AM 
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 44 
983 
offender’s life expectancy, the court can choose to strike it down.205 The general 
principle test would give courts flexibility and allow sentencing judges to punish 
juveniles who commit particularly heinous nonhomicide offenses.206 However, 
like the grossly disproportionate test, this general principle test would apply on a 
case-by-case basis, and thus some juvenile offenders would inevitably receive 
unjust de facto LWOP sentences.207 While the general principle test has some 
benefits, a categorical rule is superior because it prevents judges from imposing 
these sentences in the first place, protects all juvenile nonhomicide offenders, and 
encourages states to reform their juvenile justice systems.208 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS 
This Part discusses the consequences of imposing a categorical ban on de 
facto LWOP sentences for juveniles. Section A examines whether a categorical 
rule will actually help juvenile offenders or whether judges will merely grant 
lengthy but barely constitutional sentences. Section B examines policy 
implications of such a rule, including whether states need to rethink their 
sentencing practices. 
A. A Chance for Hope or No Hope at All? 
If states ban de facto LWOP sentences, they will have to develop new 
sentencing regimes that address juvenile offenders who commit nonhomicide 
crimes. One obstacle to implementing such a system is that sentencing law is 
notoriously complicated and legislatures tend to grant sentencing judges a 
healthy amount of discretion.209 Unfortunately, this means that some prosecutors 
and judges might pursue sentences that are just short of an unconstitutional de 
facto LWOP sentence.210 If the average life expectancy of a typical American 
 
205. In theory, prosecutors might ask for a sentence that falls just short of a defendant’s life expectancy 
so they could argue it does not run afoul of Graham’s general principles. See Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 882–
83 (discussing the application of Graham’s general principles). Courts that apply this test should be wary of 
arguments that attempt to elevate form over substance. 
206. See supra note 194 (describing an instance of a nonhomicide offense). 
207. See generally Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 882 (applying the general principle test as applied to 
Mendez’s sentence only). 
208. See infra Part IV.A (discussing possible reforms). 
209. See, e.g., Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 882 n.8 (discussing in detail how Mendez’s eighty-four-year 
sentence was calculated). Another obstacle is that juvenile nonhomicide offenders who are already serving de 
facto LWOP sentences will have to navigate the labyrinth of habeas corpus proceedings in order to obtain 
release, which is no easy task. See generally, Theresa Hsu Schriever, Comment, In Our Own Backyard: Why 
California Should Care About Habeas Corpus, 45 MCGEORGE L. REV. __ (forthcoming) (discussing at length 
the serious obstacles prisoners face when attempting to overturn wrongfully imposed sentences).  
210. See, e.g., Craig S. Lerner, Juvenile Criminal Responsibility: Can Malice Supply the Want of 
Years?, 86 TUL. L. REV. 309, 367–68 (2011) (describing at least one case in which a judge sentenced a minor to 
a ninety-year sentence, but the judge’s reasoning constituted a “transparent disregard for the Graham 
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male is seventy-six years,211 it is plausible that some courts might sentence 
juvenile offenders to a term of years that falls just short, and thus avoid 
constitutional scrutiny. 
In Florida, for example, juveniles have received little relief despite 
Graham.212 Although the Court prohibited juveniles from serving actual LWOP 
sentences, Florida courts circumvented the Court’s holding by sentencing 
juveniles who committed nonhomicide crimes to de facto LWOP sentences 
instead.213 For example, a thirteen-year-old juvenile offender—who may have 
received an actual LWOP sentence before Graham—received a sixty-five-year 
de facto LWOP sentence after committing “a series of robberies and rapes.”214 
Thus, the Florida courts continue denying juvenile offenders a meaningful 
opportunity for release, which is contrary to Graham’s rationale.215 Courts that 
seek to follow the Supreme Court’s holding—that states must provide a 
meaningful opportunity for release—should be careful not to elevate form over 
substance. 
Assuming courts implement categorical bans against de facto LWOP 
sentences for juveniles who commit nonhomicide offenses, state legislatures may 
need to confront a vexing question—how exactly does one provide a meaningful 
opportunity for release? As Justice Kennedy admits, categorical rules “tend to be 
imperfect.”216 But state legislatures can make up for the inherent deficiencies in 
categorical rules—and avoid unjust sentencing practices—by developing specific 
sentencing schemes that address juvenile offenders who commit nonhomicide 
crimes.217 There are a few solutions for legislatures, though no solution is perfect. 
First, a legislature could adopt conditional release statutes that allow certain 
individuals—typically those who have reached the age of sixty-five and have 
already served at least ten years of their sentence—to petition for release.218 
While these broad statutes would allow juvenile offenders to seek relief from 
 
decision.”). 
211. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 882. 
212. See infra text accompanying notes 213–15 (discussing Florida’s use of de facto LWOP sentences). 
213. Lloyd Dunkelberger, Juvenile Offenders Still Get Near-Life Terms, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, 
Nov. 21, 2010, at A1. 
214. Id. 
215. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010) (requiring states provide juvenile offenders a 
meaningful opportunity for release). Could some of these sentences be the result of bad lawyering? Some 
advocates argue courts should allow juveniles to challenge their sentences based on ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims if their attorney failed to offer mitigating evidence. Beth Caldwell, Appealing to Empathy: 
Counsel’s Obligation to Present Mitigating Evidence for Juveniles in Adult Court, 64 ME. L. REV. 391 (2012). 
216. Id. 
217. See California v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291 n.5 (Cal. 2012) (“We urge the California State 
Legislature to enact legislation establishing a parole eligibility mechanism that provides a defendant serving a 
de facto life sentence without possibility of parole for nonhomicide crimes that he or she committed as a 
juvenile with the opportunity to obtain release on a showing of rehabilitation and maturity.”). 
218. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 47-5-139 (2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-40.01 (2009) (allowing 
certain offenders to petition for conditional release).  
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lengthy sentences, a juvenile might still spend several decades in prison, while an 
adult offender could take advantage of the statute sooner. A legislature could also 
cap the number of years that juvenile offenders can serve in prison, for example 
at twenty-five years. While this method would allow juveniles an earlier 
opportunity to petition for release, it would also prevent judges from awarding 
harsher sentences to juveniles who commit nonhomicide, but nonetheless 
horrific, offenses.219 Finally, a legislature could pass a statute that allows courts to 
consider whether the juvenile offender has demonstrated a desire to reform after 
the offense was committed; such factors could include participation in 
educational, vocational, or counseling programs.220 Regardless of what method a 
state chooses, it must always keep in mind that it must offer juvenile offenders a 
meaningful opportunity for release.221 
B. Additional Policy Implications 
In addition to the statutory solutions mentioned above, states might want to 
experiment with a more radical option—reducing the number of juveniles 
charged as adults.222 Instead of sending these juvenile offenders through the court 
system, states could implement rehabilitative programs, or reform their existing 
juvenile justice systems to meet the needs of juvenile offenders who might 
reoffend if they were released.223 As one juvenile justice advocate argues, “[t]he 
States must give credence to the Court’s conclusions by providing juveniles with 
sufficient opportunity for personal development. Otherwise, the opportunity for 
personal growth will effectively become a non-opportunity as incarcerated 
juveniles learn to become seasoned criminals while subjected to the highly 
criminogenic adult prison culture.”224 
 
219. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2036 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (discussing specific instances where 
juvenile offenders committed serious nonhomicide offenses). 
220.  Gerard Glynn & Ilona Vila, What States Should do to Provide a Meaningful Opportunity for 
Review and Release: Recognize Human Worth and Potential, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REV., 310, 346–48 (2012). 
221. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2036 at 2030 (majority opinion). 
222. JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA, CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE 47 (2011), available at 
http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/pdfs/cjsc/publications/misc/jj11/preface.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review) (stating that in 2011, California probation departments reported 912 transfers to the adult system). 
223. See generally Green, supra note 153 (discussing various ways that rehabilitative principles conform 
with Graham’s holding). 
224. Id. at 12. In addition to introducing rehabilitative programs, a state may also have to reform its 
parole system to give juvenile offenders a meaningful opportunity for release. See Michelle Marquis, Graham v. 
Florida: A Game-Changing Victory for Both Juveniles and Juvenile-Rights Advocates, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
255, 282–87 (2011) (discussing how compliance with Graham will also implicate changes to state parole 
boards). In California, for example, the State’s Realignment plan may offer an opportunity to implement such 
changes. See generally Andrew M. Ducart, Comment, Go Directly to Jail: How Misaligned Subsidies 
Undermine California's Prisoner Realignment Goals and What Is Possible to Maximize the Law's Potential, 44 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 481 (2013); Steven Thomas Fazzi, Comment, A Primer on the 2011 Corrections 
Realignment: Why California Placed Felons Under County Control, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 423 (2013) 
(analyzing the implementation of California’s Realignment plan).  
_05_FREEMAN_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 1/31/2014 9:41 AM 
2013 / The Reality of de Facto LWOP Sentences 
986 
Unfortunately, introducing rehabilitative elements into existing state criminal 
justice systems is easier in theory than in practice. For example, “adult court 
sentencing practices are largely based upon punitive considerations,” which is 
often a disadvantage to juvenile offenders.225 For instance, when the California 
Second District Court of Appeal sentenced Victor Mendez, who had committed 
his crimes at age sixteen, to eighty-four years in prison, it did not take into 
account “Mendez’s personal and family life and upbringing.”226 Indeed, when a 
Florida court sentenced Terrance Graham, the sentencing judge focused more on 
his repeat offender status than the fact that Graham’s parents “were addicted to 
crack cocaine [and that] Graham began drinking alcohol and using tobacco at age 
nine and smoked marijuana at age thirteen.”227 
Moreover, even if a state does offer rehabilitative programs, those programs 
may fall victim to budget cuts. For example, at one point California threatened 
budget cuts to the state’s Department of Juvenile Justice, which would further 
strain an already burdened system.228 “Under the budget reduction enacted [in 
December 2011], the agency will cease to exist unless counties pony up $125,000 
a year per youth offender.”229 In a situation like this, the worst-case scenario is 
that prosecutors may start charging juvenile offenders as adults instead of 
sending them to the endangered department, which might expose these juvenile 
offenders to unconstitutional de facto LWOP sentences.230 Although the cuts were 
later rescinded,231 difficult fiscal times might threaten juvenile justice institutions 
again. States determining whether to cut their juvenile justice agencies will have 
to weigh the long-term goals of reforming juvenile offenders against any short-
term fiscal gains. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Graham v. Florida offers hope for juvenile justice advocates. The Court’s 
decision to create a categorical rule outside the context of the death penalty—and 
directly aimed at juveniles—suggests that it will start taking a hard look at how 
 
225. Green, supra note 153, at 20. 
226. California v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870, 884 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2010). 
227. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2018–20 (quoting the sentencing judge as saying, “And I don’t 
understand why you would be given such a great opportunity to do something with your life and why you 
would throw it away.”). 
228. Marisa Lagos, Juvenile Offenders: Cuts Put Counties on the Spot, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 26, 2011, at 
A1. 
229. Id. 
230. See id. (noting that some opponents of the budget cuts warn that “[i]f prosecutors do not believe 
there is a safe, affordable place to house juvenile criminals, they may be more likely to charge more of them as 
adults, and subject them to state prison.”). 
231. Rina Palta, Brown Backs Off Plan to Shut Down Youth Prisons, 89.3 KPCC (May 16, 2012), 
http://www.scpr.org/blogs/news/2012/05/16/6146/division-juvenile-justice/ (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review). 
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states punish young offenders. But because the lower courts have largely resisted 
extending Graham’s general principles, most juvenile offenders serving de facto 
LWOP sentences for nonhomicide crimes have had little success challenging 
their sentences.232 While the California Supreme Court’s Caballero decision is a 
victory for juvenile justice advocates, it is unclear whether other courts will 
construe Graham to include de facto LWOP sentences.233 
The solution is for the courts to adopt a categorical rule inspired by, but 
completely separate from, Graham.234 A categorical rule will force state 
legislatures to develop new statutory schemes that will address the deficiencies of 
the current systems. These statutory schemes may involve conditional-release 
programs, a maximum sentence for all juvenile nonhomicide offenders, or 
perhaps a greater focus on rehabilitation.235 Such arrangements would also allow 
states to comply with the Court’s command that juvenile offenders receive a 
meaningful opportunity for release. Advocates for a categorical rule should 
expect a tough fight, especially given the lower courts’ reluctance to extend 
Graham in general.236 However, this Comment provides an initial framework for 
advocates because an examination of government data suggests that states rarely 
impose de facto LWOP sentences on juveniles who commit nonhomicide 
offenses.237 
The actions of the United States and California Supreme Courts should 
inspire further conversation about how juveniles are punished and rehabilitated. 
This conversation is worth having because the status quo is untenable. 
Fortunately, the United States Supreme Court appears to recognize this problem. 
Advocates should be encouraged that the Court has expressly considered the 
mindset of the typical juvenile offender in Roper and Graham; and in both cases, 
the juvenile offender’s relative lack of mental development and maturity 
convinced the Court to alter longstanding sentencing practices.238 In a sign of how 
far the Court has come, the Miller v. Alabama Court altered longstanding 
sentencing practices, even though the juvenile offenders were convicted of 
 
232. Hechinger, supra note 15, at 425 n.91. 
233. Admittedly, California’s approach avoids the difficulty in determining the existence of a national 
consensus. But as Justice Werdegar notes, “we are extending the high court’s jurisprudence to a situation that 
court has not had occasion to address.” California v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 296 (Cal. 2012) (Werdegar, J., 
concurring). Indeed if courts analyze de facto LWOP sentences under the traditional Eighth Amendment 
framework as opposed to extending Graham, then they will still have to find evidence of a national consensus. 
See supra Part II.A (discussing this framework). 
234. See supra Part III.B (discussing the framework for a categorical ban). 
235. See supra Part IV.A (discussing potential solutions for state legislatures if confronted with a new 
categorical ban on these sentences). 
236. See Hechinger, supra note 15, at 425 n.91 (noting that most defendants who rely on Graham to 
challenge de facto LWOP sentences are unsuccessful). 
237. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing the statistical evidence suggesting a national consensus exists). 
238. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing why juvenile offenders who are sentenced to life with the 
possibility of parole are less culpable than those sentenced to LWOP). 
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homicide.239 When the Court next hears an Eighth Amendment case involving 
juveniles, it will likely consider the offender’s personal background and 
hardships.240 The fact that the Court has taken a strong interest in juvenile 
offender cases suggests now is a perfect time to challenge de facto LWOP 
sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders. As the California Supreme Court 
showed in California v. Caballero, this is a fight that can be won.  
 
239. See 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (holding that the Eight Amendment bars mandatory LWOP sentence for 
juveniles convicted of homicide). 
240. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2018 (2010) (describing Terrance Graham’s difficult 
upbringing in the second paragraph of the case); Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468 (noting that one of the juvenile 
offenders had a tragic family history: “Both his mother and his grandmother had previously shot other 
individuals.”). 
